|
Winners of the 2004 ECGI Clinical Paper Competition
| Stockholm, 9 December
2004 - The winners of the 2004 ECGI Clinical paper Competition
were announced at a ceremony organised by the ECGI, the Journal
of Financial Economics (JFE) and the Center for Business and
Policy Studies (SNS) with financial support from the Jan Wallander
and Tom Hedelius Foundation. All six papers were presented
to the jury, after which the prizes were awarded by Lars
Engwall, Secretary-General of the Jan Wallander and
Tom Hedelius Foundation. |
 |
First prize
|
 |
First prize went
to Julian Franks, London Business School,
Colin Mayer, Saïd Business School,
University of Oxford and Stefano Rossi,
London Business School for their paper Ownership:
Evolution and Regulation (See Working
Paper 9/2003 revised December 2004).
The picture shows (l to r) Stephano Rossi
and Julian Franks receiving their First
Prize certificates and a cheque for €4,000 from Lars
Engwall, Secretary-General of the Jan Wallander
and Tom Hedelius Foundation. |
| Summing up the jury's
verdict of the winning paper, Professor Claudio Loderer
said: "The paper provides a careful and detailed
review of the long-run evolution of investor protection, equity
financing and corporate ownership in the U.K. over the 20th
century. It makes an important contribution to the literature
by showing that, unlike what one would have expected, dispersed
ownership of large listed companies is not necessarily tied
to regulation and laws that protect minority investors. Trust
and informal relations could have provided the necessary protection." |
Second
prize
|
The second prize
of €2,000 went to Frederick H. deB. Harris
and Sherry L. Jarrell, Wake Forest University,
Thomas H. McInish and Robert A.
Wood, University of Memphis for their paper.
Minority Shareholder Expropriation and Asymmetric Information
Flows in a Global Registered Share: The Saga of DaimlerChrysler
(See Working Paper
60/2004)
The picture shows (l to r) Sherry Jarrell, Thomas
McInish and Robert Wood receiving
their Second Prize certificates and a cheque for €2,000
from Lars Engwall, Secretary-General of
the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. |
 |
| About this paper, Professor
Loderer said: "The paper examines the causes
of the significant and puzzling migration of ownership and
trading of DaimlerChrysler from New York to Frankfurt after
the merger of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz. According to the
careful and detailed investigation conducted by the authors,
the reason could be the lack of protection afforded to minority
shareholders by the corporate governance and disclosure standards
of DaimlerChrysler, a company incorporated in Germany. " |
Joint
third prize
|
| The third prize of €1,000
was shared between two papers How
Preussag became TUI: Kissing too many toads can make you a
toad by Ingolf Dittmann,
Ernst Maug and Christoph Schneider,
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (see Working
Paper 58/2004) and Czech
Mate: Expropriation and Investor Protection in a Converging
World by Mihir A. Desai,
Harvard University and NBER and Alberto Moel,
Monitor Corporate Finance, Monitor Group (see Working
Paper 62/2004). |
 |
On the Preussag paper,
Professor Loderer said: "The paper
investigates the performance of Preussag, a diversified German
conglomerate, during 1997-2003. The firm changed its focus
from old economy businesses to tourism and logistics. In their
thorough analysis, the authors document, among other things,
the particular decision-making problems associated with crossholdings;
they document the poor governance that arises almost inevitably
from combinations of public and private governance; and they
argue that managerial discretion over large amounts of liquid
resources can be deleterious." |
| The picture
above shows (l to r) Christoph Schneider,
Ingolf Dittmann and Ernst Maug,
winners of the joint Third Prize. The picture below shows
Mihir Desai receiving the joint Third Prize
certificate from Lars Engwall, Secretary-General
of the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. |
| On the
Czech Mate paper, Professor Loderer said:
"The paper studies the expropriation of a foreign
investor by a local partner and the subsequent resolution
of that case through international arbitration. The paper
carefully shows, among other things, how ownership of shares
can be of secondary importance in determining control and
how corporate control is shaped by geographical proximity." |
 |
|
|